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Highlights 15 
- Disruption of feed-forward activity effected conscious and unconscious processing more 16 
than later interference. 17 
- Exploratory analysis indicated later interference changes response criteria.  18 
- Feed-forward/recurrent processing might better reflect perception/report than 19 
unconsciousness/consciousness. 20 
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 21 
Abstract 22 
It has been theorised that cortical feed-forward and recurrent neural activity support 23 
unconscious and conscious cognitive processes, respectively. Here we causally tested this 24 
proposition by applying event-related transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) at early and 25 
late times relative to visual stimuli, together with a pulse designed to induced blindsight – a 26 
condition where conscious and unconscious perception dissociate. Consistent with pre-27 
registered hypotheses, early TMS affected residual, reportedly “unseen” capacity. However, 28 
conscious perception also appeared critically dependent upon feed-forward processing to a 29 
greater extent than the later recurrent phase. Additional exploratory analyses suggested that 30 
these early effects dissociated from top-down criterion measures, which were most affected 31 
by later TMS. These findings are inconsistent with a simple dichotomy where feed-forward 32 
and recurrent processes correspond to unconscious and conscious mechanisms. Instead, 33 
different components of awareness may correspond to different phases of cortical dynamics 34 
in which initial processing is broadly perceptual whereas later recurrent processing might 35 
relate to decision to report. 36 
 37 
Introduction 38 
One of the most influential functional descriptions of how and when consciousness manifests 39 
in the human brain is the suggestion that the initial feed-forward and later recurrent sweeps of 40 
activity support unconscious and conscious processing, respectively (V A Lamme, 2001, 41 
2006a; V A Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; V A Lamme, Super, Landman, Roelfsema, & 42 
Spekreijse, 2000). Correlational evidence links early electrophysiological visual components 43 
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to reportedly “unseen” masked stimuli (Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2007). However, 44 
direct causal evidence, involving a manipulation of “unseen” capacity, is lacking though there 45 
have been unsuccessful attempts to manipulate it (Koenig & Ro, 2019; Koivisto, Railo, & 46 
Salminen-Vaparanta, 2011). Disruption of cortical activity very early on, relative to stimuli 47 
presentation, has not been shown to interfere specifically with unconscious perception, as 48 
would be expected under Lamme’s theory. Conscious awareness of stimuli, by contrast, not 49 
only correlates with the presence of later field potential activity (Victor A F Lamme, 50 
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, & Spekreijse, 1999) but interference with relatively late (>~100ms) 51 
visual cortical activity using TMS has repeatedly been shown to suppress conscious 52 
awareness (Allen, Sumner, & Chambers, 2014; Amassian et al., 1989). Where such a 53 
suppression dissociates from preserved “unseen” perceptual capacity, regardless of TMS 54 
onset time, it is known as TMS-induced blindsight (Allen et al., 2014; Boyer, Harrison, & 55 
Ro, 2005; Jolij & Lamme, 2005; Ro, Shelton, Lee, & Chang, 2004). The aim of the current 56 
experiment was to determine the relationship between feed-forward/recurrent activity and 57 
conscious/unconscious processing using a modified TMS-induced blindsight paradigm to 58 
differentially interfere with early and later processing (see Figure 1). This involved applying 59 
TMS at different times, relative to the presentation of stimuli, where TMS applied early 60 
disrupted feed-forward processing to a greater extent than when TMS was applied at later 61 
times. 62 
In addition to being suggested as critical for conscious processing in general, recurrent 63 
activity has been predicted more specifically to be important for so-called “phenomenal” 64 
consciousness (see Block, 2007, pp. 498), but to date this proposal lacks empirical support. 65 
Although notoriously difficult to define, phenomenal consciousness is associated with the 66 
‘what it is like’ experiential aspect of consciousness (Block, 2011). Phenomenal 67 
consciousness is supposed to be (potentially) distinct from access and reportability. The most 68 
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commonly cited examples used in support of phenomenal consciousness are paradigms based 69 
on the work of Sperling (1960), in which participants report having been consciously aware 70 
of display items (e.g. an array of letters) the content of which they cannot access or report 71 
(precisely which letters were displayed) unless cued. This has been interpreted as evidence of 72 
participants having been phenomenally conscious of a rich scene, but where working memory 73 
constraints limits the amount they can access and report at any one time. The measures in our 74 
experiment were designed to track the same response types as found in the Sperling task, and 75 
in particular the case where participants acknowledge conscious phenomenal awareness of 76 
stimuli but fail to perform a forced choice discrimination associated with it, indicating a lack 77 
of working memory capacity or access (see Methods). By measuring the proportion of such 78 
responses during TMS-induced disruption of recurrent processing, we sought to put Block’s 79 
(2007) prediction to the test. 80 
Our study thus tested three pre-registered hypotheses. First, consistent with previous 81 
observations (Allen et al., 2014; Boyer et al., 2005; Jolij & Lamme, 2005; Ro et al., 2004), 82 
our baseline hypothesis was that occipital TMS applied at 110ms post stimulus onset should 83 
cause blindsight. Our primary experimental hypothesis was that an additional TMS pulse 84 
applied during the early feed-forward sweep should disrupt “unseen” discrimination 85 
sensitivity to a greater extent when compared with later TMS. Finally, our secondary 86 
hypothesis was that an additional TMS pulse applied during later processing should disrupt 87 
“phenomenal” consciousness to a greater extent than earlier TMS.  88 
 89 
 90 
 91 
 92 
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Methods 93 
Overview 94 
The methods described here match those pre-registered (https://osf.io/d7uik/), where any deviations, 95 
aside from tense and clarifications, have been made explicit. All procedures received ethical approval 96 
from the Cardiff University, School of Psychology ethics committee in accordance with the 97 
declaration of Helsinki. Data, analysis programs and copies of stimulus materials are available at 98 
https://osf.io/dwfqv/. 99 
Participants 100 
Seventy-nine participants attended an initial session all of whom had passed initial TMS safety 101 
screening (Maizey et al., 2013). 50 participants (22.4 mean age ±3.2SD range 19 - 37, 34 female) 102 
went on to complete the full experiment which involved between 8-12 hours of testing over 3 to 8 103 
sessions separate by at least 24 hours. Of the participants who initially signed up for the experiment 104 
13 did not continue to the main experiment owing to inability to perceive phosphenes within safety 105 
limits, a further 4 participants did not take part owning to large or uncomfortable facial twitches, 12 106 
withdrew voluntarily (see Exclusion Criteria).  107 
Design 108 
One common strategy to probe consciousness is to contrast measures that track conscious awareness 109 
of stimuli against perceptual measures where awareness is lacking in some way – with the difference 110 
between them revealing what might be involved in consciousness (H C Lau & Passingham, 2006). 111 
Blindsight, in various forms, is an archetypical example of this dissociation. Our paradigm was 112 
designed to measure conscious and unconscious perception and be capable of demonstrating 113 
dissociations between these measures. Arrow target stimuli were presented against luminance noise 114 
on half of all trials (Figure 1A). Of the remaining trials, half (25% of total) contained a non-arrow 115 
stimulus and half contained only noise (stimuli absent) (Figure 1A). Following each presentation 116 
subjects were asked three questions: 'Did you consciously see the arrow? (Yes or No)', 'Did you see 117 
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something? (Yes or No)', and 'Was it pointing Left or Right? (Figure 1A). Participants were instructed 118 
to respond positively to the 'arrow' question if they are aware of the arrow and to respond positively to 119 
the 'something' question if they were aware of either the arrow or the non-arrow being present. 120 
Additionally, they were instructed to use the 'something?' question to indicate any awareness they felt 121 
they had of the stimuli possibly being present. In this way the 'something?' question was designed to 122 
reflect a lower level of awareness than the 'arrow?' question. With respect to the left / right 123 
discrimination, participants were also instructed to offer their best guess as to the direction of the 124 
arrow, irrespective of whether or not they believed the arrow is present. Responses were unspeeded. 125 
Full task instructions can be found in Supplementary Materials and were available to participants in 126 
each session. In addition to pre-registered procedures, verbal instructions were regularly repeated to 127 
participants, especially if the participant expressed some confusion with respect to making a 128 
directional decision on the basis of what they believed to be an absence of information, as was often 129 
encountered. The content and structure of these instructions were largely maintained in order to 130 
minimise variability between experimenters who collected data (CA, JS, TV, HC), where participants 131 
were told “If you see it say you saw it, if you don’t say ‘no’ and always try your best on the left/right 132 
decision even if you don’t think anything was presented”. 133 
Previous research has shown that applying TMS at around 110ms post stimulus onset is effective in 134 
producing TMS-induced suppression awareness (Amassian et al., 1989) and blindsight (Allen et al., 135 
2014; Boyer et al., 2005). The primary intervention of this experiment was the application of TMS at 136 
this time and to combine this with the application of additional single pulses on the same trials either 137 
before or after this 'Blindsight Inducing Pulse' (BIP). The BIP was experimentally necessary as 138 
previous research (Allen, 2012; Allen et al., 2014; Koenig & Ro, 2019) and piloting indicated that 139 
single pules TMS, or pairs of TMS pulses in rapid succession, are largely ineffective in changing 140 
residual “Unseen” discrimination. The BIP therefore enabled us to probe the primary experimental 141 
hypotheses. As the BIP interferes with later recurrent processing the differences between temporal 142 
intervention conditions is a relative one, in which early feed-forward processing is disrupted to a 143 
greater extent when TMS is additionally applied before the BIP, in comparison to when it is applied 144 
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after the BIP. The times chosen for these additional pulses were at 30ms, 70ms, 150ms and 190ms 145 
from stimulus onset (see Figure 1B). This meant that there were five temporal TMS conditions, one 146 
where the BIP was applied in isolation to demonstrate TMS induced blindsight, and four in which 147 
pairs of pulses were applied at the BIP and additional times designed to target different stages of 148 
processing. When TMS was applied at the BIP (110ms) and at 30ms or 70ms the data relatively 149 
probed the role of the early feed-forward sweep, whereas TMS applied at the BIP (110ms) and at 150 
150ms and 190ms informed the role of recurrent processing. The use of two time points before and 151 
two time points after the BIP was intended to increase the likelihood of affecting processing. It also 152 
allowed for the examination of the time course of any disruption with greater accuracy than would be 153 
possible if only one additional TMS pulse was administered before or after the BIP. These finer 154 
granularity time points were only examined when appreciable differences between early versus late 155 
interventions were observed. 156 
Each participant completed 12 blocks of active TMS and 12 blocks of control (sham) TMS, each 157 
consisting of 80 trials. Each participant therefore completed 1920 experimental trials. As there were 158 
four stimulus conditions (left arrow, right arrow, non-arrow and stimulus-absent) and five temporal 159 
TMS conditions (BIP in isolation, 30ms&BIP, 70ms&BIP, BIP&150ms and BIP&190ms), each block 160 
contained four repetitions of each unique condition, the order of which was randomised. The number 161 
of blocks completed on any single day of data collection varied according to factors such as 162 
participants' availability.  163 
The control condition was sham stimulation in which the coil is placed over the target region but 164 
oriented such that the magnetic flux entering the scalp is minimal. Blinding to this control was 165 
attempted; although participants are often aware of the differences between active and sham TMS. 166 
Since the central questions of this investigation involved contrasting two active TMS conditions (early 167 
vs. late effects), this temporal control makes the issue of ineffective blinding less problematic than is 168 
the case with the majority of sham controlled experiments. Due to the large area affected by a round 169 
TMS coil (Roth, Saypol, Hallett, & Cohen, 1991), and the possible involvement of a wide range of 170 
areas in the processes under investigation, vertex or other site based controls were not suitable. 171 
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There were six possible orders in which the experimental questions could be presented, all of which 172 
were used over the course of the experiment. A single order of questions was maintained throughout 173 
each block and participants completed four consecutive blocks of the same question order before a 174 
new order was applied. The order in which the six question orders were applied was randomised for 175 
each participant. When each new question order was introduced, participants were given ten practice 176 
trials to familiarise themselves with the task. These practice trials were not analysed. An equal 177 
number of active and control blocks were completed for each question order, resulting in six possible 178 
active/control orders per question order. Each participant completed a full set of active/control orders 179 
and these were randomised for each participant independently of question order. 180 
 181 
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 182 
Figure 1. Experimental design. A. Depicts the time course of a single trial. The three stimuli conditions are 183 
presented, including stimulus-present (arrow), non-arrow and stimulus-absent (noise frame). Questions are as 184 
presented to participants at the end of each trial in counterbalanced order. Two primary measures traced i) 185 
participants conscious awareness of the stimuli (PrC) via their response to the ‘did you see’ arrow and 186 
something yes/no questions and ii) a measure of residual “unseen” capacity (PcU) which was based on left/right 187 
performance capacity when participants reported not having seen the arrow or something (see Methods and 188 
Participant Instructions). B. Illustrates the different TMS conditions, indicating the interventions applied at the 189 
Blindsight Inducing Pulse (BIP, 110ms), together with separate pulses on the same trial during an 'early' phase 190 
to target feed-forward processing (30ms or 70ms), or during a 'late' phase to interfere with later, putatively 191 
recurrent processing (150ms or 190ms). C. Illustrates the approximate positioning and orientation of the 90-mm 192 
round TMS coil used in the experiment and a cartoon representation of feed-forward and recurrent processing.   193 
Measures  194 
Non-parametric signal detection theory was applied to derive a measure of conscious detection  195 
(Table 1 describes the conscious detection measure (PrC) in terms of signal detection theory classes, 196 
(Corwin, 1994; Macmillan et al., 1990). This is the non-parametric equivalent of detection d’. The 197 
measure of conscious detection also takes account of reflective reports made by participants following 198 
their participation in an almost identical task (Allen et al., 2014). That is, the allocation of response 199 
patterns to signal detection categories was informed by reports made by participants about their 200 
experience of the task (Varela, 1996). For example, responding negatively to the 'arrow?' question and 201 
positively to the 'something?' question in the presence of a non-arrow was classed as a 'correct 202 
rejection', as opposed to a 'hit', because participants felt the primary way they approached the task was 203 
the detection of the arrows, not detection of the non-arrows. Reportedly “unseen” sensitivity (PcU) 204 
was quantified by Left/Right discrimination capacity when participants respond negatively to both the 205 
'arrow?' and 'something?' questions (Cheesman & M. Merikle, 1987; Zoltan Dienes, 2004). This 206 
measure was therefore composed of trials where participants had twice reported the stimuli as 207 
“unseen” and where residual perceptual sensitivity was indicated by left/right performance being 208 
greater than chance at 50% (PcU>0.5). TMS-induced blindsight effects were defined as a statistically 209 
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significant drop in conscious detection, while concurrent “unseen” discrimination capacity is shown to 210 
be above chance and ideally unaffected by the intervention. 211 
 212 
 Response  
Stimulus Something? Arrow? 
SDT 
Class 
Arrow 
Yes Yes HIT 
No No MISS 
Non-
arrow 
Yes Yes FA 
Yes No CR 
Nothing 
Yes Yes FA 
Yes No FA 
No No CR 
Table 1. Signal detection theory classes for measures of conscious awareness (PrC). FA = False Alarms; CR = 213 
Correct Rejections. Hit Rate = Hits/(Hits + Miss); False Alarm Rate = FA/(FA+CR); PrC = Hit Rate – False 214 
Alarm Rate (Corwin, 1994). 215 
 216 
A central aim of this experiment was to assess if and how reportedly “unseen” discrimination capacity 217 
was affected by TMS applied at different times. However, if a participant were to have demonstrated 218 
no evidence of residual “unseen” capacity in baseline conditions, then the central question would have 219 
been unanswerable when applied to their data. Therefore, an amendment was made, early in the data 220 
collection (https://osf.io/x9pig/), to apply additional criteria in which participants were excluded from 221 
the analysis involving PcU, if they did not demonstrate evidence of baseline (sham) “unseen” 222 
capacity. Individual PcU performance in the sham condition (across TMS time conditions) was 223 
assessed relative to chance using a one-tailed z-test based upon a cumulative normal distribution, 224 
where chance is PcU=0.5, the number of trials contributing to PcU measures was the 'n' coefficient 225 
and alpha was 0.05. If a participant’s “unseen” performance was not greater than chance, then they 226 
were excluded from the analysis of PcU only. This resulted in the removal of eight participants. 227 
The primary hypothesis was tested by the analyses of changes in the PcU and PrC measures. To probe 228 
the secondary hypothesis an additional measure (PCm) was developed, to reflect the presence of 229 
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‘phenomenal’ consciousness relative to conscious access. The intention here was not to question 230 
Block's proposed conceptual distinction, but rather to probe an empirically tractable prediction made 231 
by Block with respect to phenomenal consciousness. Block appeals to several conditions which 232 
express phenomenal consciousness in isolation, but the example most often cited in recent works are 233 
the experiments conducted by Sperling (e.g. Sperling, 1960, cited in Block, 2007, 2011). In these 234 
experiments, participants are shown an array of (typically 12) letters for a brief period of time, of 235 
which they acknowledge awareness (they state that they saw an array of letters). Participants can 236 
generally only freely identify 3-4 letters out of each display. However, given a post-stimulus cue to 237 
any of the rows in the display, subjects can identify the letters in that row. According to Block, this 238 
suggests that participants are phenomenally conscious of all the specific letters in the array, but cannot 239 
access information about all of them at any one time, due to working memory constraints. A specific 240 
prediction made by Block is that this behavioural manifestation of phenomenal conscious will be 241 
accompanied by recurrent processing (pp.498 Block, 2007). If this is so, then the current experiment 242 
is a valid way of testing whether recurrent processing is associated with phenomenal consciousness 243 
through the demonstration of expressions of phenomenal consciousness and the manipulation of 244 
recurrent processing.  245 
The PCm was designed to follow the similarities between the current experimental configuration and 246 
the interpretation of the Sperling experiments by Block (2007, 2011), using detection without 247 
identification as an appropriate measure of phenomenal consciousness in contrast and relative to 248 
conscious access (which Block, (2012), still seems to support). The numerator of the PCm was 249 
acknowledged awareness, indicated by positive responses to both detection questions, while the 250 
directional discrimination judgment was made incorrectly and the denominator was all arrow present 251 
trials, see Supplementary Method for further details. 252 
 In addition to the primary measures (PrC and PcU) the same SDT classes could be used to drive a 253 
measure of bias (BrC) which was applied as an exploratory measure, where BrC = False Alarm Rate 254 
/(1-PrC) (Corwin, 1994). This is the bias connate of the primary conscious detection sensitivity 255 
measure (PrC).  256 
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Calibration 257 
Prior to the experimental sessions, participants attended a threshold session where, following a period 258 
of familiarisation with the task, the stimuli were calibrated by adjusting the luminance of the target to 259 
produce a PrC level of 0.5 used in the subsequent experimental session. This involved generating a 260 
psychophysical function of each participants conscious detection performance over a range of stimuli 261 
luminance intensities, which could then be solved for a PrC level of 0.5. Each data point in this 262 
function was the result of performance over a mini block consisting of 20 trials. Once the participants' 263 
specific luminance was established, a number of additional mini blocks were completed to ensure 264 
stability. If a fluctuation in PrC performance was observed beyond a criterion level of ±0.1 PrC units 265 
then small adjustments were made according to the psychophysical function such that performance 266 
was maintained at a PrC of ≈0.5. At the start of each experimental session, participants also completed 267 
a mini training block and similar adjustments were made as required. This session-specific updating 268 
of baseline stimulus levels was designed to lessen the impact of day-to-day variation in task 269 
performance. Each active TMS block was accompanied by a sham block in which the luminance of 270 
the targets was equal. When more than two blocks were completed within a single experimental 271 
session the participants' performance over the control block served as equivalent to a mini block and 272 
so indicated whether an adjustment of the stimuli should be made for subsequent blocks. 273 
During the threshold session, participants were also be screened for suitability for TMS (see Maizey 274 
et al., 2013) and a phosphene threshold (PT) obtained (Franca, Koch, Mochizuki, Huang, & Rothwell, 275 
2006). The method used here resembled that of Franca et al., (2006) and has been previously 276 
described (Allen et al., 2014, https://osf.io/d7uik/).  277 
Equipment  278 
TMS was administered with a Magstim high-power 90mm round coil in conjunction with a Magstim 279 
Rapid2 biphasic stimulator. Pulse delivery was controlled via a Cambridge Research Systems (CRS) 280 
Visage running Real Time Sequencer software on a Matlab platform, which also governed stimulus 281 
presentation on a gamma-corrected 21” Mitsubishi CRT monitor (100Hz vertical refresh rate) at a 282 
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viewing distance of 720mm. To expand upon the stimuli details described in the pre-registration 283 
document: each trial commenced with a 1500ms fixation period, followed by the onset of the 284 
luminance noise, consisting of each bar in the matrix (see Figure 1) pseudo-randomly alternating in 285 
luminance (range 25 candela/m2, white noise distribution) every 20ms. After 800ms the stimuli or a 286 
noise frame (stimulus absent) appeared for 20ms as an addition to the noise of a uniform increase in 287 
luminance, the level of which was determined according to the participants calibration. This followed 288 
by a further 400ms of noise before the questions were displayed. The noise occupied 1.9o of visual 289 
angel and the stimuli subtended to 0.8o × 1.4o. 290 
TMS pulses in the experimental sessions were delivered at 120% of participants PT. If participants 291 
expressed discomfort during the threshold session when TMS was applied at 120% of PT the TMS 292 
intensity was reduced to 110% of PT. 3 participants received stimulation at 110% of PT. The mean 293 
level of absolute stimulation intensity as a proportion of maximum stimulator output was 78.0% ± 294 
13.7SD. 295 
The TMS coil was oriented with the handle pointing upward and side ‘B’ facing the participant, so 296 
that the induced current passed initially in a left-to-right direction. Coil positioning was initially based 297 
on anatomical proximity to the calcarine sulcus, localised in individual structural MRI scans. 298 
Immediately prior to each TMS block, the intensity was set to 130% of PT and the coil was moved so 299 
that it produced a phosphene that the participant reported as being “reasonably clear” and, “at least in 300 
part, covering the centre of their visual field” with their eyes closed. The coil position was then 301 
recorded using a Brainsight system (Rogue Research Inc.) and used for the subsequent block of trials. 302 
If the participant was observed to have moved beyond a 5mm tolerance of the original coil position, 303 
indicated by the brainsight system, then the block was paused and the coil repositioned to the recorded 304 
site. An approximation of this position was used in the sham condition but with the coil perpendicular 305 
to the scalp so that the rim pointed toward the head, and with a 10.6mm plastic spacer inserted 306 
between the scalp and coil to replicate the contact artefact.  307 
To exclude effects of TMS-induced blinks on performance, eye tracking was undertaken throughout 308 
the experiment using a CRS chin-rest-mounted infrared eye tracker (250Hz). Trials were excluded on 309 
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the basis of blinks identified by a shift in pupil position (>1o) followed by a transitory (< 1 Sec) loss 310 
of pupil signal, coincident with the stimulus presentation. This resulted in the exclusion of 205 out of 311 
96,000 trials. One block for one participant was excluded from the pupillometry analyses due to a data 312 
saving error.  313 
Statistical Analyses 314 
The first question posed in the analysis was whether the BIP in isolation produced a blindsight type 315 
effect. This was to be demonstrated by a significant suppression of conscious detection during active 316 
TMS relative to sham, while concurrent “unseen” performance was above chance and ideally 317 
maintained. A paired t-test was used to compare active to sham PrC performance, and a one sample t-318 
test was used to compare PcU performance to chance (PcU≈0.5) in the active condition. A series of 319 
corresponding Bayesian analyses were also implemented (see below). PcU performance was also 320 
tested for the effects of TMS using a paired t-test. If PcU performance over the BIP was suppressed 321 
by the TMS, in addition to PrC, then this lessened the extent to which the observed phenomena was 322 
classified as a form of blindsight because the dissociation between the two measures (PcU and PrC) 323 
would be incomplete. However, such a demonstration did not negate the ability of the experiment to 324 
demonstrate other temporally bound effects of the TMS, such as the temporal dynamics of 325 
unconscious vision.   326 
The main analysis of this experiment involved the PcU measure: comparing the effects of TMS 327 
applied before vs. after the BIP. Using the sham-normalised data, a paired t-test compared data 328 
collected when TMS was applied before the BIP (PcU  sham mean of 30ms&BIP and 70ms&BIP) to 329 
when it was applied afterward (PcU  sham mean of BIP&150ms and BIP&190ms).  330 
A number of additional analyses were implemented to investigate the effects of the TMS timing on 331 
measures with the finer resolution (e.g. comparing the effects of 30ms&BIP to the effects of 332 
190ms&BIP). These analyses were only to be implemented if the primary analyses, described above, 333 
warranted their application through the demonstration of reliable effects (p<0.05 or B>3 or <1/3, see 334 
below). 335 
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For all proposed paired t-tests, corresponding Bayesian analyses were implemented (Z Dienes, 2008, 336 
2011; Zoltan Dienes, 2014; Gallistel, 2009; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). As 337 
described (https://osf.io/x9pig/) measures were assessed relative to a sham TMS baseline and 338 
concerned a comparison between the temporal TMS conditions. Small changes were therefore more 339 
probable than larger changes within a potential range of fluctuations from sham. Bayesian tests 340 
applied to temporal comparisons were based upon half normal priors, starting at zero, whose variance 341 
was equal to half of the mean difference between the orthogonal active/sham conditions. Bayesian 342 
tests using such priors are relatively assumption free and therefore conservative, defaults. This was 343 
the main test applied to temporal order effects and the resultant Bayes factor is described as BFmain.  344 
As the PrC measures had a maximum range of 0.5 (from threshold level of 0.5 to 0) this was used as 345 
the upper limit for prior uniform distributions representing the current hypothesis (see Dienes, 2008, 346 
2014). The range of the prior representing any changes to PcU spanned from the peak value, 347 
irrespective of TMS conditions, to chance levels at 50% correct and the resultant Bayes factors are 348 
denoted as BFuni. In addition to pre-registered tests we applied a Bayesian test with a default JZS 349 
priors (BFjzs) as has become standard practice (Rouder et al., 2009). This applied a default scaling 350 
factor of 0.707 in line with standard recommendations but representing the expectation of a 351 
large/medium effect size in all applications. These tests were applicable to both change from sham 352 
and temporal comparisons tests. With respect to the temporal comparisons, owing to the double 353 
baselining (active vs. sham and early vs. late) and consequent reduction in effect size, it is noted that 354 
these are conservative tests. 355 
By implementing these Bayesian statistics we were justified in continuing to collect data until either 356 
strong support for the hypothesis was obtained (BFmain >=3) or, conversely, strong support for the null 357 
was obtained (BFmain<=1/3, Z Dienes, 2011; Jeffreys, 1961).  Therefore, only when either of these 358 
conditions were satisfied (B>3 or <1/3), for the primary analysis of PcU comparing early and late 359 
effects, conventional t-tests were implemented, reported and data collection terminated (July 2018). 360 
Where comparisons of active to sham TMS were required, the vector representing the effect for each 361 
dependent measure was active minus sham, and a hypothesised suppression was represented by a 362 
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negative prior. If comparison between early and late effects was required and the prediction was for 363 
an earlier suppression then the vector was as follows: [active 30ms&BIP minus sham 30ms&BIP, 364 
active 70ms&BIP minus sham 70ms&BIP] minus [active BIP&150ms minus sham BIP&150ms, 365 
active BIP&190ms minus sham BIP&190ms], which was integrated with a negative prior. If the 366 
hypothesis was for a later effect, then this same vector was integrated with a positive prior. 367 
Additionally, priors with the opposing directionality were be implemented to assess potential 368 
unpredicted effect (see Table 2). 369 
In terms of phenomenal consciousness, the main question was whether or not the measure of 370 
phenomenal consciousness (PCm) was suppressed when TMS was applied relatively late compared to 371 
earlier applications. The same structure of tests applied to the PcU measure was also appropriate for 372 
this PCm analysis. However, as the PCm measure was, as far as we are aware, completely novel, its 373 
range and variance could not be easily predicted a priori although the half normal approach described 374 
above was applicable. Because it is possible that the BIP in isolation may have been sufficient to 375 
disrupt recurrent processing and therefore suppress phenomenal consciousness, an active vs. sham set 376 
of analyses was implemented comparing active BIP vs. sham BIP and active vs. sham where data was 377 
collapsed across temporal interventions and comprised of t-test's and Bayesian analyses using the 378 
same prior structure as described for the early vs. late analyses.  379 
Only if the primary analysis of PCm effects ( sham early vs. late TMS) demonstrated reliable effects 380 
(p<0.05 or B>3 or B<1/3) further analysis were implemented in order to investigate alternative 381 
explanations. As no such effects were observed, anticipated further analysis were not implemented but 382 
the details of which can be found at https://osf.io/d7uik/. 383 
Exclusion criteria 384 
Participants were [to be] excluded according to the following criteria:  385 
- Screening indicated that the participant present an elevated risk of seizure or other safety 386 
considerations, in line with ethical approval set out by the ethics committee at the School of 387 
Psychology, Cardiff University (also see Maizey et al., 2013; Wassermann, 1998) 388 
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- Participants who did not report phosphenes within the described safety limits.  389 
- Participants who reported adverse reactions to the TMS (Maizey et al., 2013).  390 
- Participants who demonstrated large facial twitches or expressed discomfort when TMS was 391 
applied at the prescribed levels. Although trials during which participants blinked during stimuli 392 
presentation were removed from the analysis, if this exclusion resulted in the loss of 30% or more of 393 
data under the active TMS condition, then the participants data was to be removed from group 394 
analysis.  395 
- Participants who demonstrated an inability to follow task instructions. This may have been 396 
expressed in three ways: 397 
• If a participant were to have persistently pressed the same left / right button when they were 398 
reflectively unaware of the stimuli, then this strategy would have negated the purpose of the 399 
experiment and they would have been excluded from the analyses. This strategy would have 400 
been identified by the same left/right discussion being made on 75% or more of the “unseen” 401 
trials. No participants were exclude on this basis. 402 
• If a participant were to have responded negatively to all yes/no questions when under a 403 
specific experimental condition (such as active TMS) they would have been excluded, as this 404 
would have indicated that their responses were the result of expectation rather than 405 
experimental manipulation (Ericsson, 2003). No participants were excluded on this basis. 406 
• If a participant were to give illogical responses (i.e. reporting 'yes' to the 'arrow?' question and 407 
'no' to the 'something?' question) on greater than 2.5% of trials, they were to be excluded. One 408 
participant was excluded on this basis. As they were only identifiable on the basis of a 409 
complete data set, unlike other exclusions, they were included in the 50 reported to have 410 
completed the experiment. 411 
-  If coil repositioning, due to subject’s movement, was required on 50% or more of active TMS 412 
blocks, the participants data was to be excluded.  413 
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- Other unanticipated technical error may have led to the loss of data and therefore the exclusion of 414 
participants. 415 
- Statistical outliers at the participant level were identified and excluded using Chauvenet's criteria 416 
(Taylor, 1997). This was applied to each of the critical analyses described above (t-test and Bayesian 417 
analysis) for each measure separately. This exclusion therefore only pertained to the measures in 418 
question, rather than the removal of the participants data from all analyses as with other criteria in this 419 
section. The application of Chauvenet's criteria involves describing each analysis as a single vector 420 
(as with the Bayesian analysis above). If the likelihood of any data point on that vector, times the 421 
number of data points, was less than 0.5 then that data point was to be excluded from the analysis in 422 
question only. Likelihood being defined as the location on a probability distribution function 423 
representative of the vector in question. See Table 2 and SM3 for related exclusions. 424 
- Participants may have withdrawn voluntarily from the experiment for any reason.  425 
 426 
Results 427 
Consistent with our baseline hypothesis, TMS applied in isolation at 110ms after stimulus 428 
onset (the blindsight inducing pulse - BIP) produced evidence of a blindsight related effect: a 429 
significant suppression of conscious detection (active vs. sham PrC, T(48)= -3.03, p=0.004, 430 
Mean=-0.08, 95% CI [-0.13, -0.03], d=0.43, BFuni
1=12.46, BFjzs=8.44) while “unseen” 431 
discrimination (PcU) remained above chance (with pre-registered exclusions T(40)=6.82, 432 
p=3.33×10-8, mean=0.65, 95% CI [0.61, 0.69], d=1.07, BFuni=2.97×10
9, BFjzs=4.12×10
5, 433 
without exclusions T(49)=6.91, p=9.07×10
-9, mean=0.65, 95% CI [0.61 0.70], d=0.98, 434 
 
1 Bayes Factors (BF) reported are the ratio of likelihood odds, given the data, of the alternative hypothesis H1 
over the null hypothesis H0, where H1 is represented by a uniform prior (BFuni) ranging from 50% (chance) to 
peak value for measure PcU and ranging from 0 to 0.5 (thresholded range) for the PrC measures. BFmain 
corresponds to primary prior applied to temporal comparisons, composed of half normal distribution, starting at 
zero, with variance equal to half of the mean difference between orthogonal active/sham conditions. The BFjzs 
prior is the result of applying a default prior with default scaling (0.707, see Methods, Rouder et al., 2009). 
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BFuni=6.51×10
9, BFjzs=1.38×10
6). However, an exploratory analysis also indicated that the 435 
BIP also suppressed PcU compared to sham (T(40)=-2.70, p=0.01, mean=-0.09, 95% CI [-436 
0.15, -0.02], d=0.42, BFjzs=3.97). Although above chance perception in the presence of twice-437 
denied awareness was demonstrated, a complete dissociation of TMS effects between PrC 438 
and PcU was not observed, which lessens the extent to which the phenomena might be 439 
understood as a form of Blindsight. This may be consistent with previous studies, which have 440 
also failed to show a complete dissociation between conscious and residual perceptual 441 
capacity (Hurme, Koivisto, Revonsuo, & Railo, 2017, 2019; Koivisto, Henriksson, Revonsuo, 442 
& Railo, 2012; Lloyd, Abrahamyan, & Harris, 2013; Railo, Andersson, Kaasinen, Laine, & 443 
Koivisto, 2014; Railo, Salminen-Vaparanta, Henriksson, Revonsuo, & Koivisto, 2012). 444 
The primary question of this study was whether “unseen” discrimination was suppressed to a 445 
greater extent by early TMS compared with late TMS. This hypothesis was supported, albeit 446 
weakly in the initial analyses which collapsed data across the two early and two late 447 
interventions (PcU  sham early vs. late T(40)=-1.93, p=0.06, BFmain=3.82, BFuni=1.20, 448 
BFjzs=0.90, see Figure 2A and Table 2). Further pre-registered analyses in which individual 449 
TMS onset latencies are analysed separately revealed strong evidence that TMS applied at the 450 
earliest time (30ms) suppressed PcU compared to its later TMS counterpart at 190ms (T(40)=-451 
3.57, p=9.39×10-4, mean=0.08, 95% CI [0.34,0.12], d=0.56, BFmain=89.37, BFuni=135.95, 452 
BFjzs=32.05, see Figure 2A). This finding supports the primary hypothesis that residual 453 
“unseen” discrimination depends upon the early feed-forward sweep of activity (V A Lamme 454 
et al., 2000). 455 
However, contrary to the theory relating conscious awareness to later recurrent processing (V 456 
A Lamme et al., 2000), conscious detection was also suppressed to a greater extent by early 457 
TMS compared to late TMS (PrC  sham early (30 and 70 ms) vs. late (150 and 190 ms) 458 
T(48)=4.17, p=1.25×10
-4, mean=-0.06, 95% CI [-0.08,-0.03], d=0.60,  BFmain(earl>late)=0.05, 459 
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BFmain(late>early)=1.73×10
3, BFuni(late>early)=408.90, BFjzs=187.88, see Figure 2B and Table 2). A 460 
direct correspondence between feed-forward/recurrent processing and unconscious/conscious 461 
perception was therefore not observed. 462 
 463 
 464 
Figure 2. Illustration of group level results for primary measures. Values on the abscissa denote TMS onset 465 
relative to stimuli onset. TMS applied at 110ms is the Blindsight Inducing Pulse (BIP) applied in isolation. All 466 
other pulses were applied in addition to the BIP. Panels A and B refer to the primary measures of  “unseen” 467 
discrimination (PcU) and conscious detection (PrC) and bar inserts collapse data across the early (30 and 70ms) 468 
and late (150 and 190ms) epochs, illustrating the data to which primary analyses were applied to test temporal 469 
order effects. Error bars are the within-subject standard error (Loftus & Masson, 1994). Cartoon illustrations at 470 
the bottom of the panels indicate the periods most effected by the interventions, corresponding to those depicted 471 
in figure 1. 472 
 473 
The measure of ‘phenomenal’ consciousness (PCm) was higher under active conditions 474 
compared to sham (across times T(47)=2.02, p=0.049, mean=3.97×10
-3, 95% CI 475 
[0.13,7.91]×10-3, d=0.29 BFjzs=1.01), but not significantly for the BIP in isolation (T(47)=0.91, 476 
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p=0.37, mean=3.50×10-3, 95% CI [-0.00, 0.01], d=0.13, BFjzs=0.23). This secondary analysis 477 
indicated that participants were more likely to acknowledge awareness of the arrow but report 478 
its direction incorrectly during occipital vs. sham TMS. Such errors, under Block’s 479 
interpretation, can be understood as failures of access consciousness and, therefore, a relative 480 
elevation of phenomenal consciousness as indicated by the acknowledgment of awareness. 481 
Exploratory analyses indicated that these trends were preserved and their statistical reliability 482 
elevated when contributing trial numbers were increased as the alternative measures of 483 
‘phenomenal’ consciousness were applied (see Supplementary Materials Table SM3 and 484 
Methods: Measures). However, the pre-registered analysis revealed no clear evidence that 485 
later TMS changed PCm more than early TMS (PCm  sham early vs. late T(47)=0.33, 486 
p=0.74, BFmain(early>late)=0.91, BFmain(late>early)=0.64, BFjzs=0.17, see Figure 3 and Table 2). 487 
Therefore, these results did not support the secondary hypothesis that phenomenal 488 
consciousness is supported by recurrent processing. 489 
 490 
 491 
Figure 3. Secondary measure designed to track ‘phenomenal’ consciousness (PCm), in which the numerator 492 
consist of trials where awareness is acknowledged (‘yes’ to ‘arrow?’ and ‘something?’ questions) but the 493 
responses also indicated a lack of access (a left/right error) and the denominator is all trials where such a 494 
response profile was possible. Plot conforms to the same format as figure 2. 495 
 496 
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In addition to pre-registered analyses, our design allowed us to derive an exploratory measure 497 
of response criterion (BrC), quantifying the participant driven tendency to respond to 498 
questions about awareness (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). Recently response bias has been 499 
highlighted as a measure of interest with respect to top-down influences and subjective 500 
qualities (Peters, Ro, & Lau, 2016). Across times there was no clear evidence that 501 
participants were any more likely to report awareness irrespective of stimuli under active 502 
TMS conditions compared to sham (T(46)=1.41, p=0.17, mean=0.02, 95% CI [-0.01,0.05], 503 
d=0.20, BFjzs=0.40). However, in contrast to both primary perceptual measures, which were 504 
affected by early TMS, the criterion measure was affected by the application of later TMS 505 
compared to early TMS (BrC  sham early vs. late T(46)=-2.16, p=0.036, BFmain(early>late)=0.34, 506 
BFmain(late>early)=3.59, BFjzs=1.31, see Figure 4 and Table 2). This indicates that participants 507 
were more likely to report awareness independently of what was presented, or had a lower 508 
criterion, when active TMS was applied at a later time. Additional exploratory measures are 509 
considered in Supplementary Materials. 510 
 511 
 512 
Figure 4. Illustration of exploratory measures of criterion (BrC) which is the non-parametric signal detection 513 
theory criterion connate to the PrC sensitivity measure. Plots conform to the same format as figure 2. 514 
 515 
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Measure T p df mean 95% CI d 
BFmain BFmain BFuni  BFuni  
BFjzs 
Number 
 
early>late late>early early>late late>early outliers 
primary 
PcU -1.93 0.06 40 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.30 3.82 0.19 1.20 0.03 0.90 1 
PrC -4.17 0.00 48 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.60 1734.41 0.05 408.90 0.01 187.88 0 
secondary PCmA 0.33 0.74 47 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.64 0.91 NA NA 0.17 1 
exploratory BrC -2.16 0.04 46 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.32 3.59 0.34 NA NA 1.31 2 
 517 
Table 2. Summary of temporal order comparisons applied to measures. Highlighted in bold are the predicted 518 
effects critical to the interpretation of the primary hypotheses. d is Cohen's d and 95% CI are the 95% 519 
confidence intervals around the mean difference. BF refers to Bayes Factor, where ‘main’ applies a prior based 520 
on half the mean difference between the active and sham conditions. ‘Uni’ refers to a uniform prior, when 521 
applied to PcU its range is equal to the range from chance to it’s peak value irrespective of TMS for PrC its 522 
range is 0.5. jzs refers to the default prior described by (Rouder et al., 2009) scaled to 0.707. 523 
 524 
Discussion 525 
Primary hypotheses and measures 526 
Our results support the hypothesis that the early feed-forward sweep of occipital activity 527 
supports “unseen” capacity (V A Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) but are inconsistent with the 528 
hypothesis that consciousness is supported by later recurrent processing. Although there is 529 
ample evidence that conscious awareness is associated with later recurrent processing (V A 530 
Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Pitts, Metzler, & Hillyard, 2014; Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene, 531 
2005), there is also evidence linking early components of activity with awareness 532 
(Mathewson, Gratton, Fabiani, Beck, & Ro, 2009; Railo, Koivisto, & Revonsuo, 2011). Here 533 
we predicted that later intervention would cause a suppression of the conscious perception 534 
measure, but the data indicated that conscious perception also critically depends on early 535 
activity. A proponent of the classic theory linking conscious processing to recurrent activity 536 
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would likely argue that this is to be expected, as the later recurrent phase is dependent upon 537 
the initial forward sweep of information. The feed-forward sweep could therefore be 538 
understood as enabling or preparatory (Allen et al., 2014; Marr, 1982) rather than constitutive 539 
of conscious awareness, and so disruption of the feed-forward input could be expected to 540 
interfere with later conscious processing. In this way, the later phase might still constitute the 541 
conscious process. However, such a distinction between merely enabling conscious 542 
processing and constituting it is difficult to maintain. Our data suggests that conscious 543 
detection depends upon early processing to a greater extent than on later processing, 544 
suggesting that early feed-forward activity may play a more important causal role. If this is 545 
so, it is difficult to see why early activity should not be as tightly associated with conscious 546 
perception as later recurrent activity.  547 
Residual “unseen” capacity has appeared to be resilient to TMS interventions (Allen, 2012; 548 
Allen et al., 2014; Boyer et al., 2005; Koenig & Ro, 2019), although one study has reported 549 
perturbation with TMS at 60ms post stimulus, consistent with the current findings (Hurme et 550 
al., 2017). The resilience of residual capacity, together with the evocation of TMS-induced 551 
blindsight, motivated the application of the BIP on all trials, which, in combination with 552 
relatively high trial numbers and sample sizes, allowed us to map the temporal dependencies 553 
of “unseen” sensitivity. However, TMS pulses carry their effects forward in time and the 554 
presence of the BIP meant that to some extent recurrent activity was interfered with under all 555 
active conditions. The difference between early and late conditions is therefore a relative one. 556 
Recurrent processing is affected in all conditions, but the effects on conscious detection and 557 
“unseen” sensitivity were affected to a greater extent when early feed-forward processing was 558 
disrupted compared to TMS applied later on.  559 
Both conscious detection and “unseen” discrimination sensitivity appeared to be most 560 
susceptible to early interventions, and both were susceptible to the BIP in isolation. Whilst 561 
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the susceptibility of “unseen” discrimination to interventions can in part be attributed to 562 
relatively well numerated data, it also possibly suggests that they are supported by a common 563 
perceptual mechanism and differences between these two measures could be interpreted as 564 
differences in subjective thresholds and approaches to the task (Peters & Lau, 2015). 565 
Criteria measures of consciousness 566 
The effects of TMS upon criterion/bias dissociated temporally from the primary measures, 567 
with later TMS, as opposed to early TMS, being the more effective intervention. How then is 568 
bias, and the kind of false alarm error which drives it, to be understood? Bias, operationalised 569 
as the propensity to report awareness, might reflect a form of awareness that is independent 570 
of perception, and the contrast between bias (also understood as subjective criterion) and 571 
objective perception could be fruitful in uncovering the top-down, dispositional and 572 
subjective aspects of consciousness (Peters et al., 2016). If the criterion measure tracks some 573 
form of subjective awareness or interpretation, the later TMS effects could support Lamme’s 574 
framework. Indeed, under the ‘neural stance’ (V A Lamme, 2006a) the measure of criterion 575 
should be understood as relating to consciousness to a greater extent than the detection 576 
measures precisely because it is affected by later TMS, although such a position could be 577 
criticized for circularity (Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010). 578 
Until now, relatively few examples of dissociations involving criterion have received 579 
attention, and investigations have more commonly focused on the problems of bias and the 580 
need to remove criterion from measures (Balsdon & Azzopardi, 2015; Lloyd et al., 2013; 581 
Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004). Although there are circumstances where removing 582 
subjective criteria is useful (for example, when comparing perception across individuals or 583 
looking at changes in strategy over time), when the focus of the enquiry relates to 584 
consciousness, removing the subjective element could be counterproductive (Hakwan Lau, 585 
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2008). Although exploratory, the current observations of a causal, temporal dissociation 586 
where perceptual measures are affected early and bias was affected later (c.f. Figure 2 vs. 4) 587 
has the potential to inform our understanding of conscious processes. Later TMS increased 588 
reported awareness independently of perception. Whether this lowering of criterion by later 589 
TMS is the result of suppression of the threshold for entry into consciousness (that is, 590 
disruption of suppression) or corresponds to mistakes in interpreting noisy percepts, is 591 
unclear based on the current data and may be an area for future replication and investigation. 592 
However, it does seem that the later effects relate to a high order effect upon the conscious 593 
report, rather than the perceptual or access system, involving a disposition to report 594 
awareness independently of the stimuli.  595 
Phenomenal measures 596 
With respect to the ‘phenomenal’ measures, the hypothesis that an additional TMS pulse 597 
applied during later processing should disrupt ‘phenomenal’ consciousness to a greater extent 598 
than earlier TMS was not supported. The measures of phenomenal consciousness did not 599 
show a temporal dissociation. However, as described in our pre-registered protocol 600 
(https://osf.io/d7uik/), TMS applied at the BIP and therefore under all active TMS conditions, 601 
may have to some extent disrupted recurrent processing (V A Lamme, 2006b). If so the 602 
current findings that participants are more likely to exhibit responses consistent with relative 603 
phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness, in the context of disrupted 604 
recurrent activity, may be difficult to reconcile with Block’s theory (Block, 2007).  605 
However, we acknowledge that our characterisation of ‘phenomenal’ measures may not 606 
reflect the kinds of responses Block intends in his descriptions of phenomenal consciousness. 607 
Indeed, it is possible that the apparent richness of phenomenal content corresponds to the 608 
detail and granularity of the experimental questions posed and our questioning procedure 609 
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failed to capture Block’s intention. An alternative explanation of the data is that under active 610 
TMS conditions, aspects of the cognitive processing associated with access consciousness 611 
(decision making, report) are affected such that (as above) participants are in general more 612 
likely to report awareness and make an error in, for example, reporting direction, which 613 
inflates the PcM measures. That is, the increase in ‘phenomenal’ measures during disrupted 614 
recurrent processing does not mean that there was a higher proportion of cases of phenomenal 615 
consciousness without access consciousness, but instead that there was a higher proportion of 616 
cases of ‘abnormal’ access reports. In this way, we observe changes in criterion or access that 617 
happen to fit the PcM profile. This would not be inconsistent with Block’s claim that 618 
recurrent processing is essential for phenomenal consciousness. 619 
Predictive coding interpretation 620 
The observed late effect of TMS on criterion can also be interpreted under, and potentially 621 
inform, theories of neural predictive coding. In brief, these theories hold that there are prior 622 
sets of predictions, which are then integrated with incoming information according to 623 
Bayesian principals, resulting in prediction error or free-energy which the system attempts to 624 
minimise. The results of this integration form a posterior which can then become the prior for 625 
the subsequent series of events (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010, 2012). Predictive coding theories 626 
are notoriously difficult to falsify owing to their alignment with alternative, well-established 627 
theories (e.g. attention or learning, Bowers & Davis, 2012). One of the few areas in which 628 
there appears to be unique and therefore testable predations is in the temporal order of events 629 
– the prior comes first. The prior, being the state of the system independent of the incoming 630 
information, might be seen as most closely resembling the measures of criterion, as it also 631 
reflects tendency to respond independently of incoming information. As criterion was 632 
affected at a later time, but the predictive coding framework would suggest its earlier 633 
involvement, there is a discrepancy that could be seen as contrary to the framework. 634 
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Ameliorating explanations are possible. For example, later TMS could affect the integration 635 
process resulting in posteriors that are more dependent upon the prior, as opposed to the 636 
incoming information, leading to increased false alarms. However, such an effect should have 637 
also led to a comparable loss of sensitivity under late TMS, which was not observed, 638 
although it is possible that it could have been obscured by the dominance of the early effect. 639 
Similarly, prior expectation and report contents might dissociate in other unanticipated ways 640 
or the relevant priors may be independent of activity effected by the TMS. Even though these 641 
possibilities are speculative interpretations of exploratory results we feel they are informative 642 
and worthy of note as they offer avenues for future enquiry and the discrepancy between the 643 
simplest interpretation - of top-down criterion relating to the prior - may be contrary to 644 
predictive coding, where unique testable predations are spares. 645 
Signal detection theory considerations 646 
The range of methods applied to investigate the presence of unconscious processing and 647 
related blindsight type phenomena is a matter of keen debate (Peters, Kentridge, Phillips, & 648 
Block, 2017; Schmidt, 2007). Here the decision was made to place the distinction between 649 
presence and absence of awareness in the hands of the participant where the PcU measures 650 
drew on responses where participants reported and confirmed an absence of awareness 651 
(Cheesman & M. Merikle, 1987; Zoltan Dienes, 2004; Varela, 1996; L Weiskrantz, 1997). 652 
Measures relating to the presence of consciousness (PrC and BrC) here, and more widely 653 
within the field, centre upon Signal Detection Theory (SDT) and to some extent the 654 
dissociation between sensitivity and criterion justifies the use of SDT. However, we wish to 655 
highlight a difficulty with the application of SDT within the context of consciousness 656 
research and particularly with respect to confidence or second order judgments. A central 657 
assumption in the application of both classical and second order SDT is that underlying 658 
processes are best described by a pair of distributions where a noise distribution is of 659 
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comparable magnitude to that of a signal distribution. Yet participants rarely claim awareness 660 
of stimuli that were not presented. From an evolutionary perspective, metacognitive systems 661 
that minimise drawing from such an error distribution might be successful. This might 662 
suggest that the noise distribution should not be assumed to be comparable to that of the 663 
signal, especially with respect to second order judgments. These issues are exacerbated by the 664 
parametric normalisation applied to the most commonly applied measures in this field (Green 665 
& Swets, 1966). Such measures are subject to gross distortion by low false alarm rates 666 
because normalised metrics approach infinity as false alarm rates tend towards zero2. The 667 
work-around often recommended (Hautus, 1995; Macmillan et al., 1990) is the addition of a 668 
constant to both hit and false alarm rates, or estimating false alarms rates for participants who 669 
did not make false alarms from those that did (Fleming, 2017; Lee, 2008). Although 670 
estimating reports based on other participants is preferable, within the context of 671 
consciousness research and epistemically, this work-around is highly problematic. It 672 
essentially involves the analyst generating pseudo-responses that participants did not make in 673 
order to apply their paradigm of choice. Avoidance of this issue and dependency on the 674 
assumption of any particular distribution were motivating factors for the a priori adoption of 675 
non-parametric SDT (Corwin, 1994). Although some model comparison techniques are 676 
limited by the use of non-parametric SDT, the similarity between the primary non-parametric 677 
measures applied here (PrC and BrC, Figure 2) and the classical parametric measures (d’ and 678 
c, See Supplementary Materials Figure SM1) suggest the utility of the parametric assumption 679 
may be minimal. We therefore recommend the broader adoption of non-parametric SDT in 680 
consciousness research. 681 
Blindsight  682 
 
2 Here 111 cells out of 500 contained five or fewer false alarms where there where 96 opportunities for false 
alarms per cell.  
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This paradigm was designed to be capable of demonstrating blindsight type phenomena, 683 
where blindsight is interpreted as a dissociation (L Weiskrantz, 1992) between conscious 684 
awareness of stimuli and residual (unconscious) perceptual capacity. A potential limitation 685 
for this paradigm may be that the residual, reportedly “unseen”, capacity cannot be attributed 686 
to the TMS intervention, as above chance performance is present at baseline, and therefore is 687 
less than perfectly analogous to lesion-based blindsight where the residual capacity is only 688 
apparent with the lesion. Furthermore, it is possible that the existence of blindsight and 689 
unconscious perception more generally, may be brought into question through the application 690 
of a more nuanced, less binary, questioning procedure. The distinction between unconscious 691 
and pre-reflective capacity (Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009) and the role of bias in report are 692 
important areas for development in future research. The current study, however, did not 693 
demonstrate a blindsight-type dissociation. Had the original hypothesis of a temporal 694 
dissociation been observed, where PrC would have been affected at later times in 695 
comparisons to PcU, then such a pattern may have resembled blindsight. Instead, the 696 
temporal dissociation observed between the perceptual and the criteria measures tentatively 697 
suggests that feed-forward and recurrent phases more closely reflect perception and report, as 698 
opposed to the unconscious and conscious (blindsight) dichotomy.  699 
Conclusions 700 
This investigation sought to investigate the role of feed-forward and recurrent processing in 701 
relation to visual consciousness. We found that both measures of reportedly “unseen” 702 
perception and conscious detection where affected to the greatest extent by the application of 703 
early TMS, indicating that they both critically depend upon early feed-forward processing. 704 
Exploratory analysis indicated that these perceptual measures dissociated from criteria related 705 
measures that appeared to be affected by later TMS. These findings suggest that rather than 706 
the feed-forward recurrent distinction mapping onto to the difference between conscious and 707 
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unconscious processing, the most parsimonious interpretation of the current findings is that 708 
early visual processing is more perceptual, whereas later recurrent processing relates to top-709 
down, subjective or dispositional aspects of responding.  710 
 711 
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Supplementary Material 888 
Supplementary Methods 889 
This section describes the selection of the phenomenal consciousness measure (PCm) and two sets of 890 
measures, focusing on sensitivity and bias with respect to the ‘Arrow?’ and ‘Something?’ questions 891 
independently.  892 
PCm 893 
At pre-registration we anticipated practical considerations, which may have constrained the allocation 894 
of response conditions to the PCm measures. These led to three sets of measures (see Table SM1) 895 
which contained incrementally more trials conditions and were to be sequentially applied, in the event 896 
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of one measure containing insufficient data to probe relationships between Block's phenomenal 897 
consciousness upon recurrent processing. As it transpired it was possible to use the first (PCmA) 898 
measure as presented in the main text, as PCm.  899 
There were two critical attributes that the PCm should express: i) subjects acknowledge awareness, 900 
which is an expression that there is 'something it is like' - phenomenal consciousness, and ii) with 901 
respect to the same experience, participants, access to information is limited, evidenced by incorrect 902 
responses to arrow direction or stimuli presence. All the measures described in table SM1 conform to 903 
these requirements, therefore if Block's prediction were correct, we should expect lower levels of 904 
these measures when TMS was applied late compared to when applied early, as recurrent activity and 905 
phenomenal consciousness would be disrupted.  906 
 907 
 908 
 Numerator Denominator Order of  
Measure Stimulus Something? Arrow? 
L/R 
Discrimination 
 preference 
PCmA 
Arrow 
Yes Yes Incorrect 
Arrow 
present 1 
PCmB Arrow 
Yes Yes 
Incorrect 
Arrow 
present 
2 
Yes No 
PCmC 
Arrow 
Yes Yes 
Incorrect 
all trials 3 
Yes No 
Non-Arrow Yes Yes 
N/A 
Nothing 
Yes Yes 
Yes No 
Table SM1. The three possible response category allocations to be used to derive the phenomenal 909 
consciousness measure (PCm). The final selection of the PCmA measure as representative of ‘phenomenal’ 910 
consciousness was determined according to the numbers of contributing trials. 911 
 912 
Before inferential statistics were applied to the PCm measure, the measure itself had to be selected as 913 
one of the three response category allocations described in Table SM1. The criteria for selection 914 
depended on the incidence of trials contributing to the numerator of the measure. There were four 915 
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important data points per participant (active early, active late, sham early, sham late). It was possible 916 
that Block's prediction could have been fulfilled when only two of these four cells contain non-zero 917 
data, i.e. if the phenomenal behavioural pattern was expressed only under sham TMS conditions, 918 
when recurrent processing was not disrupted by the BIP. Therefore, participant’s data was excluded 919 
when three or four of these cells are empty. This was in addition to the exclusion of individual 920 
participants data according to Chauvenet's criteria etc. (see Exclusion Criteria). Following such 921 
exclusions, if the number of contributing subjects fell below half of its original value, the next 922 
measure of preference in Table SM1 should have been used. This left open the possibility that up to 923 
half the data points of the main group level analysis could have contained zero values. Since it has 924 
been previously demonstrated that t-tests can tolerate similar levels of skewness (Sullivan & 925 
D’Agostino, 1992) and Block’s hypothesis may have been informed by such a pattern, we were 926 
justified in the application of such tests. The exclusion of individual participants’ data in terms of 927 
PCm only effected the PCm analysis so it was not relevant to the exclusion criteria set out below. In 928 
the event, anticipating these contingencies was unnecessary as the first measure of Table SM1 929 
(PCmA) fulfilled the criteria and was used as the main PCm measure. For completeness and 930 
transparency, analyses applied to the other PCm measures have been described in Supplementary 931 
Results. 932 
 ‘Arrow?’ and ‘Something?’ measures 933 
Following a reviewer’s suggestion, it may be informative to quantify sensitivity and criteria to the 934 
‘Arrow?’ and ‘Something?’ questions separately. The allocation of the signal detection classes for 935 
these measures is described in table SM2. Pr (sensitivity) and Br (criteria) measures (PrA, PrS, BrA 936 
and BrS where A stands for Arrow and S stands for Something) were derived through the application 937 
of non-parametric signal detection theory (see Measures in the main text) and identical analyses were 938 
applied as with all other exploratory measures.  939 
 940 
 941 
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Measure Stimulus Response 
SDT 
Class 
PrA, 
BrA 
Arrow 
Yes HIT 
No MISS 
Non-
arrow 
Yes FA 
No CR 
Nothing 
Yes FA 
No CR 
PrS, 
BrS 
Arrow 
Yes HIT 
No MISS 
Non-
arrow 
Yes HIT 
No MISS 
Nothing 
Yes FA 
No CR 
Table SM2. Signal detection theory classes for measures of Arrow sensitivity (PrA), and bias (BrA) and 942 
Something sensitivity (PrS), and bias (BrS)  . FA = False Alarms; CR = Correct Rejections. 943 
 944 
Supplementary Results 945 
In addition to the analyses described in the main text, our design allowed us to derive sets of 946 
exploratory measures that are potentially informative about different aspects of conscious 947 
report in relation to the feed-forward and recurrent interventions and align the current 948 
investigation with commonly used measures in the field. Temporal comparisons applied to 949 
these measures are summarised in table SM3 and follow the pre-registered analyses applied 950 
to the non-measure specific analyses. In addition to these, we present analyses applied to the 951 
alternative pre-registered measures of phenomenal consciousness (see Methods; Measures). 952 
 953 
 954 
 955 
 956 
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Measure T p df mean 95% CI d 
BFmain BFmain BFuni  BFuni  
BFjzs 
Number 
 
early>late late>early early>late late>early outliers 
p
ri
m
ar
y
 
PcU -1.93 0.06 40 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.30 3.82 0.19 1.20 0.03 0.90 1 
PrC -4.17 0.00 48 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.60 1734.41 0.05 408.90 0.01 187.88 0 
se
co
n
d
ar
y
 
PCmA 0.33 0.74 47 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.64 0.91 NA NA 0.17 1 
PCmB 0.03 0.97 46 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.58 NA NA 0.16 2 
PCmC 0.17 0.87 46 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.35 0.45 NA NA 0.16 2 
ex
p
lo
ra
to
ry
 
BrC -2.16 0.04 46 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.32 3.59 0.34 NA NA 1.31 2 
type 1 -1.01 0.32 48 -0.06 -0.19 0.06 -0.14 1.32 0.66 NA NA 0.25 0 
type 2 -0.94 0.35 47 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.14 1.31 0.44 NA NA 0.24 1 
meta diff 0.73 0.47 47 0.04 -0.06 0.14 0.11 0.93 1.06 NA NA 0.20 1 
d' -2.64 0.01 45 -0.13 -0.23 -0.03 -0.39 14.33 0.08 NA NA 3.51 0 
c 2.60 0.01 45 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.38 0.59 1.90 NA NA 3.22 0 
d' Bayes -3.02 0.00 47 -0.14 -0.23 -0.05 -0.44 37.87 0.08 NA NA 0.23 1 
c Bayes 2.79 0.01 47 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.40 0.62 1.78 NA NA 4.84 1 
HR -3.81 0.00 46 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.56 121.60 0.14 NA NA 64.38 2 
FAR 0.47 0.64 47 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.31 0.63 NA NA 0.17 1 
LR YN -0.02 0.99 48 0.00 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.78 0.77 NA NA 0.16 0 
LR YY -1.93 0.06 46 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.28 3.41 0.29 NA NA 0.87 2 
PrA -2.96 0.00 46 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.43 29.96 0.11 NA NA 7.12 2 
BrA -0.73 0.47 46 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 1.14 0.83 NA NA 0.20 2 
PrS -4.12 0.00 47 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.59 1415.17 0.05 NA NA 156.92 1 
BrS -1.42 0.16 47 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.20 1.61 0.17 NA NA 0.40 1 
Table SM3. Summary of temporal order comparisons applied to all measures, including exploratory and 957 
secondary analyses. This table conforms to the same format as Table 2 of the main text. Additionally, type 1, 958 
type 2 and meta diff refer to meta-d’ related measures (see Meta-d’ below and Fleming, 2017; Fleming & Lau, 959 
2014), d’ and c refer to classic parametric signal detection measures (see d’ and c below and Green & Swets, 960 
1966), PCmA-C refer to the alternative measures of phenomenal consciousness (see Phenomenal Consciousness 961 
measures below). d’ and c refer to the application of classic SDT metrics and are accompanied by comparable 962 
measures derived through the hierarchical Bayesian (Bayes) approach set out by Lee (2008). HR is Hit Rate and 963 
FAR is False Alarm Rate. LR YN refers to Left Right discrimination when participant report being aware of 964 
something but not the arrow and LR YY refers to discrimination when participants report full awareness. PrA, 965 
PrS, BrA and BrS refer to measures of sensitivity (Pr) and criteria (Br) to the Arrow (A) and Something (S) 966 
stimuli. 967 
 968 
 969 
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Phenomenal Consciousness measures A-C 970 
For completeness, the alternative measures of phenomenal consciousness (described in 971 
Methods; Measures) are depicted in Figure SM1 and temporal comparison statistics are 972 
described in Table SM3. From measure A to C the contributing conditions, which conform to 973 
‘phenomenal’ consciousness, expand and so the numbers of contributing trials increase. No 974 
evidence of a temporally specific dissociation was observed.  975 
 976 
 977 
Figure SM1. Full exposition of secondary measures designed to track ‘phenomenal’ consciousness, in which 978 
the numerators consist of trials where awareness is acknowledged but the responses also indicated a lack of 979 
access (e.g. for A, a left/right error) and the denominators are all trials where such a response profile was 980 
possible. Measures A to C become more liberal through the inclusion of more trials conforming to this general 981 
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pattern (see Methods: Measures and Table SM1). The primary measure for statistical purposes is PCmA where 982 
the first panel of this figure reproduces figure 3 of the main text (also see Table SM3). Plots conform to the 983 
same format as figure 2. 984 
Meta-d’ 985 
The first supplementary exploratory measure of interest is meta-d’, which is described as 986 
reflecting metacognitive sensitivity, here applied to the questions which probe reported 987 
conscious awareness of the stimuli (type 2 or meta sensitivity), and which considers the 988 
difference between this level of responding and type 1 or left / right perceptual sensitivity. As 989 
these measures have recently become widely used within dissociation paradigms similar to 990 
this, it allows for a more direct interpretation in relation to recent literature (Fleming, 2017; 991 
Fleming & Lau, 2014). Appling this measure to the current task involved treating the 992 
detection questions as confidence ratings, and the directional response was the forced choice 993 
discrimination. The highest level of confidence was when participants responded ‘Yes’ to 994 
both the ‘arrow?’ and the ‘something?’ question. The next level was responding positively to 995 
the ‘something?’ question only and the lowest level was responding ‘no’ to both questions. It 996 
is however worth highlighting that this task was not designed for such application and there 997 
were often instances where participants made no directional mistakes when reporting a higher 998 
levels of awareness. This made the application of previous iterations of the meta-d’ approach 999 
problematic for reasons described in the discussion and it was only with the publication of the 1000 
most recent hierarchical Bayesian approach to its application (Fleming, 2017) that the results 1001 
became interpretable, through the use of group level estimations of responses.  1002 
Broadly, the results showed trends in line with the observations previously reported but with 1003 
much lower effect sizes; Type-2 meta-d’ revealed a reliable difference between active and 1004 
sham conditions (T(47)=3.01, p=0.004, BFjzs=8.14) in which participants were more likely to 1005 
report awareness under the active condition, corresponding to the criterion (BrC) finding. All 1006 
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other comparisons involving related measures and including temporal comparisons did not 1007 
clearly support specific effects (T(47)<1.01, p>0.32,BF<1.06, see Figure SM2 and Table 1008 
SM3).  1009 
 1010 
Figure SM2. Meta-d’ related measures where T1 refers to type 1 perceptual sensitivity and T2 refers to type 2 1011 
or metacognitive sensitivity and T1-T2 illustrates the difference between the two. Plots conform to the same 1012 
format as figure 2. 1013 
d’ and c 1014 
To provide a more direct comparison with the wider psychophysical literature, classic signal 1015 
detection theory measures of d’ (sensitivity) and c (criterion) were calculated using the same 1016 
signal detection categorisations as PrC and BrC (Corwin, 1994; Green & Swets, 1966; 1017 
Macmillan et al., 1990). Here where false alarm rates are zero in any cell, the participant was 1018 
excluded for the corresponding classic analyses (six participants, also see discussion). 1019 
These exploratory analyses revealed effects in line with the preregistered analyses. Active 1020 
TMS suppressed d’ relative to sham (T(45)=3.75, p=5.07×10-4, BFjzs=53.79, see Figure SM3) 1021 
across times, without influencing c (T(45)=0.57, p= 0.57, BFjzs=0.19), likely due to a crossover 1022 
interaction with time (see Figure SM3). As with non-parametric measures, TMS produced 1023 
time-dependent effects on both d’ and c, with d’- reduced to a greater extent by early TMS 1024 
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compared with late TMS (T(45)=-2.64, p=0.01, BFjzs=3.51) and c-criterion lower during late 1025 
TMS compared with early TMS (T(45)=2.60, p=0.01, BFjzs=3.22, see Table SM1).  1026 
 1027 
Figure SM3. Classic parametric signal detection theory equivalent of conscious sensitivity PrC – d’ and 1028 
conscious criterion BrC – c. Plots conform to the same format as figure 2. 1029 
Hierarchical Bayes d’ and c 1030 
It is possible to apply a hierarchical Bayesian approach to produce classic signal detection 1031 
measures d’ and c (Lee, 2008; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014). This has the advantage of not 1032 
being as susceptible to empty cell issues in comparison to classic measures (see discussion), 1033 
as estimates are arrived at using group means. Additionally, this method aligns the classic 1034 
measures with the method applied to the Meta-d’ measures above. The current 1035 
implementation follows the methods described in (Lee, 2008) where bin size and sample 1036 
repletion level was set to 1000.  1037 
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The results closely follow the classic measure described above (c.f. figures SM3 and SM4). 1038 
The hierarchical Bayesian version of d’ showed a difference between active and sham 1039 
conditions across times (T(47)=-3.78, p=4.45×10
-4, mean=-0.27, 95% CI [-0.42,-0.13], d=-1040 
0.55, BFjzs=59.73). The change from sham data showed significant early suppression times 1041 
(Bayes SDT d’  sham early vs. late T(47)=-3.02, p=0.00, BFjzs=8.23, see table SM1). The 1042 
measure of bias c also showed a difference between active and sham conditions across times 1043 
(T(47)=-2.08, p=0.04, mean=0.07, 95% CI [-0.14,0.00], d=-0.31, BFjzs=1.13) and a differential 1044 
effect between early and later times (Bayes SDT c  sham early vs. late T(47)=2.79, p=0.01, 1045 
BFjzs=4.84, see table SM3) 1046 
 1047 
Figure SM4. Parametric signal detection theory equivalent of conscious sensitivity PrC – d’ and conscious 1048 
criterion BrC – c derived using hierarchical Bayesian approach (Lee, 2008). Plots conform to the same format as 1049 
figure 2. 1050 
 1051 
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HR and FAR 1052 
In addition, to the measures already discussed, we applied the same analyses to the 1053 
constituents of the conscious detection measures, i.e. hit rates (HR) and false alarm rates 1054 
(FAR). Figure SM 5 illustrates the outcomes of these analyses, where FAR showed a 1055 
significant elevation under active TMS relative to shame across times (T(47)=5.01, p=8.12×10
-1056 
6, mean=0.03, 95% CI [0.02,0.05], d=0.72, BFjzs=2344) and HR showed a weaker but 1057 
significant reduction (T(46)=-2.08, p=0.04, mean=-0.04, 95% CI [-0.08,0.00], d=-0.30, 1058 
BFjzs=1.13). However, FAR did not appear to show a clear time dependency (FAR  sham 1059 
early vs. late T(47)=0.47, p=0.64, BFjzs=0.17, see table SM1), whereas HR did (HR  sham 1060 
early vs. late T(46)=-3.81, p=4.12×10
-4, BFjzs=64.38, see table SM1) which clearly drives the 1061 
early effects on conscious detection. 1062 
 1063 
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Figure SM5. Hit Rates (A) and False Alarm Rates (B) for the conscious detection measures, where Hit Rate = 1064 
Hits/(Hits + Misses) and False Alarm Rates = False Alarms / (False Alarms + Correct Rejections), see table 2 1065 
for further specification. Plots conform to the same format as figure 2. 1066 
Discrimination under all levels of detection 1067 
This section describes left/right discrimination at the three levels of reported awareness and 1068 
applies the standard analyses applied to other measures.  1069 
When participants were fully aware of the stimuli discrimination capacity was reduced under 1070 
active TMS compared to sham across times (T(46)=-2.76, p=0.01, mean=-0.01, 95% CI [-1071 
0.02.-0.00], d=-0.40, BFjzs=4.54) and may have been effected more by the relatively early 1072 
intervention  (Pc “Yes” something “Yes” arrow   sham early vs. late T(48)=-1.93 p=0.06, 1073 
BFjzs=0.87, see table SM3), potentially reflecting the PrC detection measure, although note 1074 
that this measure was affected by celling effects (see figure SM6).  1075 
When participant acknowledged partial awareness of the stimuli (“Yes” to something and 1076 
“No” to arrow) there appeared to be relatively small differences between active and sham 1077 
conditions where participants got direction incorrect more often under the active condition 1078 
compared to sham across times (T(47)=-2.39, p=0.02, mean=-0.05, 95% CI [-0.09.-0.01], d=-1079 
0.34, BFjzs=2.02), but there did not appear to be a temporal dependency of any such  1080 
difference (Pc “Yes” something “No” arrow   sham early vs. late T(48)=-0.02, p=0.99, 1081 
BFjzs=0.16, see table SM3). This measure makes up the numerator of the PCm measure, so 1082 
closely resembles it in terms of data patterning (c.f. Figures SM6 and figure 3). 1083 
The results of applying analyses where participants respond “No” to both awareness probes 1084 
are discussed in the main text as the PcU measure.   1085 
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 1086 
Figure SM6. Left/Right discrimination capacity under all levels of reported awareness. Arrow and Something 1087 
refer to detection questions. Arrow “No” and Something “No” is equivalent to the PcU measure. Plots conform 1088 
to the same format as figure 2. 1089 
Arrow and Something sensitivity and bias 1090 
Figure SM7 and Table SM3 illustrate the measures of sensitivity and criteria applied to the 1091 
‘Arrow?’ and ‘Something?’ questions in isolation. These broadly follow the patterns 1092 
exhibited in the primary PrC and BrC measures. Potential effects on criteria are slightly 1093 
reduced in magnitude compared to BrC, likely owing to the reduction in the number of trials 1094 
contributing to each measure. One noteworthy difference between the BrA and BrS measures 1095 
is that propensity to respond positively to the ‘Something?’ question is markedly higher than 1096 
that for the ‘Arrow?’ question under the active TMS condition question, which is to be 1097 
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expected given that the ‘Something?’ question is intended to reflect a lower level of 1098 
awareness (see participant instructions below). It may also indicate that this difference in 1099 
criteria could be attributed to the lower threshold applied in response to the ‘Something?’ 1100 
question, and its susceptibility to TMS indicates that it may be a useful adjunct to future 1101 
applications of related paradigms. Alternatively, this difference between the BrA and BrS 1102 
measures to TMS, across times, could be the result of participants misinterpreting phosphenes 1103 
as some form of stimulus, or the TMS introducing some other form of uncertainty. 1104 
 1105 
Figure SM7. Arrow (A) and Something (S) sensitivity (Pr) and criteria (Br). Plots conform to the same format 1106 
as figure 2. 1107 
 1108 
 1109 
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Participant instructions  1110 
You will be shown arrows (Figure. 2 below) that appear very briefly against background 1111 
noise (Figure. 3 below). Sometimes the arrow will not appear. Your task is to decide if you saw the 1112 
arrow and which direction it was pointing. You will be asked 3 questions about this:  1113 
Did you see the arrow?    Yes/No. 1114 
Which direction was it pointing in?  Left/Right. 1115 
Did you see something?    Yes/No. 1116 
 1117 
It is important for the purpose of this study that you give your best guess for the direction 1118 
discrimination question (Left/Right?), even when you don’t see the arrow, i.e. do not simply press the 1119 
same button when you think no stimulus has been presented. 1120 
Sometimes you will see something that might have been an arrow but you cannot be sure. 1121 
This is why we ask the extra question: ‘Did you see something?’ If you have the impression that you 1122 
saw something which might have been the arrow, but cannot be sure, you should say ‘Yes’ to this 1123 
question and ‘No’ to the ‘Did you see the arrow?’ question.  You should say ‘Yes’ to the arrow 1124 
question if you were consciously aware of the arrow. Also, we sometimes show non-arrows (Figure 1125 
4). If you see this or think you might have, you should answer ‘Yes’ to the something question. If you 1126 
saw nothing but the noise you should answer ‘No’ to both the arrow and the something questions. 1127 
The order of the questions will change from one testing session to the next. At the start of 1128 
each session you will be given some practice trials to become familiar with the order of the question 1129 
and refresh your memory of the task.  1130 
You will be asked 3 questions: i) ‘Was the arrow pointing left or right?’ which will appear on 1131 
the screen as ‘L/R'. ii) ‘Did you see the arrow?’ which will appear as ‘arrow Y/N’. iii) ‘Did you see 1132 
something?’ which will appear as ‘something Y/N’. Responses will be taken on the keyboard number 1133 
pad using the 1,3,4 and 6 keys (see Figure 5). The buttons on the left (1 and 4) are for responding 1134 
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‘Left’ and the ones on the right (2 and 6) are for ‘Right’. The upper buttons (4 and 6) are for 1135 
responding ‘Yes’ and the lower ones (1 and 3) are for responding ‘No’. If at any point you enter the 1136 
wrong response please tell the experimenter immediately so that they can make a note of it. 1137 
 Sessions will involve approximately eight blocks of testing, each consisting of 80 trials. To 1138 
complete the experiment, you will undergo 3 sessions over the course of 3 to 6 days, plus calibration 1139 
days. 1140 
Calibration days will involve establishing thresholds for the task. This means we will vary the 1141 
ease of the task so that we can get a stable level of performance, which we will then use in subsequent 1142 
sessions. This will involve short blocks of trials. There will also be one of these shorter blocks at the 1143 
start of each normal testing session to check that levels of performance are constant, and adjust them 1144 
if necessary.  1145 
During the first few days we will be assessing your susceptibility to phosphenes. Phosphenes 1146 
are apparent flashes of light caused by the TMS. The experimenter will go through this with you in 1147 
more detail during the first session.  1148 
 If you have any questions, please ask. 1149 
 Thanks for reading this and participating in our experiments. 1150 
       1151 
Figure 2.      Figure 3.    Figure 4. 1152 
The arrow that you will    The noise in the absence   The non-arrow. 1153 
be looking for.    of an arrow. 1154 
   1155 
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 1156 
7 8 9 
4 5 6 
2 1 3 
Yes 
No 
R
igh
t 
Left 
Figure 5. 
The layout of the button responses on the number 
pad of the keyboard. 
